D
URING periods of acute economic depression there becomes manifest a-general disposition to take stock of our economic organization. Its sudden failure to work smoothly _ and its long convalescence become obvious to all of us, for all of us are affectedin one way or another.' Many, forced to think of these things for the first time, imagine that all this, is unusual or can be easily rectified.
But what really happens during a depression is a painful exaggeration of all the economic maladjustments and stresses that are taking place in lesser degree all the time. It is their magni tude , and their wide-spread impact that alone agitate and bewilder us. In normal times there is poverty and a great deal of it; there is inequality in the distribution of wealth; there is unemployment of a general character as well as that which -applies / to -particular industries; there are bankruptcies and' losses as well as profits. All these are inherent in the way ,our economy works. The depression intensifies just as the boom minimizes them. So when we ask ourselves what ought to be done to correct a depression, 'we are really implying the broader question: what ought to be done to make our economic organiza tion function in such a way as to reduce its pernicious social by-products to a minimum? A very large question indeed. It is a question) however, which is -being answered all the time. It' is being answered piecemeal-in the way that, with the growing consciousness of these evils, society meets problem by problem and attempts to apply 'the n' ecessary correctives. These are sometimes fitful, sometimes ill-advised, some-times re~ctionary in their effects, but cumulatively they lead to change and are really dictated ,by the prevailing economic conditions themselves.
There is social and economic introspection all the time. Depressions quicken our consciousness of our economic environment.
That introspection~ taken in its broader :' aspects, ttends to lead,either to pessimism or to optimism regarding the ends of our machine culture and whither it is leading 'mankind. For many it requires no depression to spur their speculations about our factory civilization. They see in it the disintegration of all human· values and the apotheosIs of a materialism which will eventually destroy liS. ' Dissenters to the cult of materialism in its modern form, such as Spengler and Dean lnge, have been described as jaundiced philosophers who see our culture as through a glass darkly. Business cycles for tnem are much less important than the historical cycles of cultures, the tidal ebb and flow of ideas and ideals, social forms and social activities. The depression is only another symptom. We are'in a repetitive flux. Like the mayfly we are . permitted only a few gyrations in the sun; the seeds of decay ?-nd death are in the first raptures of conception, and though we die to be born again, there is no assurance that we are reborn into a better world.
Our economic sy-stem with all its false valu~s will eventually collapse, and the kind of civilization it has produced will go down with it. The descent may be gradual or as violent as a depression that has no recovery. All values will be confused, and it will be many years before we grope to a new sense of human endeavour and human purposes. According to these pessimists there is no escape for us. We, have progression, they say, without THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY _ progress. We -delude ourselves that it is a matter of reculer pour mieux sauter, 'whereas, in all probability, we are like snow-blind men who lose themselves in ' spirals, going but getting nowhere.
. Economic t~ends and cycles are, therefore, but miniature experiments in our cyclical development. If there is a trend beneath these cultural periQdici ties, the import of it is lost to us. The conception of biological adaptation, which we derive from the theory of evolution, does not necessarily imply adaptations that are more satisfactory for things of the " spirit, that disembody the soul of man from the gross materialism of his universe, that lift him out of himself. Man may struggle with h,is environment, adapt and change, but he is always the :victim of it. His culture pattern may change, is bound to change, bu t the weaving and un wea ving of it is like Penelope's task, a hopeless and fruitless repetition.
That is the general thesis-a philosophy of fatalism. We are only different from termites in so far as we have the privilege of changing the shape and design of our ant-hills .
. These philosophers go further and say that they see in our modern culture all the signs of disintegration. What we have laboriously built up from the time of the Renaissance, our political and our social arrangements, our conceptions of man's place and end.in the universe, the extension of man's power over his environmentall that is now past the peak; we are on the declivity; history is repeating itself, and they are sounding the alarm.
These philosophers are not scare-mongers but reasonable exegetists. ·. They have spread the book of our civilization before us and are reading their lessons from . it. They point to the materialism of the ag!;; the en-ECONOMIC ADAPTATJONS slavemen t of man to the machines his ingenuity has created; cycles of depression; the social tensions and strains; :the sapping of, morals with jts attendant evil that marriage is no longer sacrosanct or even, in some countries, a. working arrangement; the irresponsible emotionalism that conles -from mass-production of nationalisms, mass-production -of prejudices, mass democracy; the low art of the period as witnessed in literature (cf. best sellers), architecture (cf. hideous skyscrapers), painting with its pornographic advertising, poetry and drama with their modern morbid insistence on sex and all.its concomitants. This list is by no means complete, but' it is a skeleton that anyone with th~ red corpuscules of puri tanism in his blood can fill ou t in to a flesh-and-blood monster of devouring proportions.
These philosophers have sown their dragon's teeth, and a mighty crop of champions and apologists has arisen to do battle for the modern man, to hold a ' shining mirror up to his achievemen ts and to show witha] that so far from being decadent he is a lusty, go-ahead, essentially moral,' essentially right specime'n of the human race, indeed, such a specimen as the world has never seen before. His conquests" too, are only in the . inchoate' stage; he is conquering nature, conquering his machines and their environmental evils" conquering himself-all those 0 atavistlc survivals and more recent superstitions that have led him astray. He is the scientific man~ His approach to his environment, to his institutions, indeed tp himself, is factual, analytic, con~ scious. He no longer relies on natural laws, on the longrun beneficence of providential control, on any outside factors beyond his control or cognizance. He is taking his evolution in hand, not allowing his biological adaptations to be accidental or implicit but under his directive 44S control. Why speak, therefore, of decadence, of declivities, of cultural doldrums? His _ possibilities, his potentialities are infinite. The only condition to his advance is the heat of the sun. While the sun lasts, while the gravitati, dnal or relativity laws of the universe remain as a working arrangement, man's dominion will be limited only by his knowledge and the use 'he makes of it. Those who speak like that are the optimists. They see no end to progress. What is progress, tl).ey ask, but the enlargement of man's horizon, the reach of his in telligence, the spread of his power? 'The assumption is that the biological adaptations that ensue" whether consciously or unconsciously conceived, are bound 'to be good for man. Man will have his advances and his setbacks, it is true, but on the whole they will be beneficent. The cyclical theory is met by saying that there are no longer any geographical frontiers. Dark regions and dark ages can never again submerge modern , culture. The universality of communication and contact, the merging of peoples, the growth of a world point of view in place of a sectional outlook have, within the last three hundred years, knit the world into a cuI tural and economic unit. There can no longer be isola tion or insulation. This is proved by the spre.ad of wes tern ci yiliza tion. I ts original diffusion poin t in its economic and ' political impetus was England. From there it spread over the greater part of Europe, over North America, impinging also upon South America) over Australasia) and now Africa; it has found a home (in spite of Ghandi's negative resistance) in India, a welcome I reception in Japan, a beginning in China. I ts momentum is carrying all before it; like the swollen Nile it is being . directed to fertilize the whole human terrain; it has no desert places. There can be no cuI tural recidivism, no backsliding, no stopping. The world is rapidly becoming a cultural unit. Eastern cultures ,by their very mediaevalism will be absorbed, engulfed in the maw of the West.
-The modern smelter will remould them, and whatever survivals there may be, these will not soften or make brittle the alloy. lV!an is just starting. I t is ridiculous to ask where he is going; the important point is that he is getting there! The optimistic school, in opposition to. the pe, ssimistic, points with becoming pride to modern achievemen ts: the tremendous output of goods, the increase of physical wellbeing, the extension of wants and their fulfilment; the conquest of nature, the enslavement of her powers to augment the muscles of man, the greater contra] and understanding of physical laws, the greater equality among men, political and social freedom,_ the breakdown of caste and other distinctions, the extension through education to the masses of the privileges of cultural advancement in general, the uplifting of man, the common man, to levels of leisure and culture no previous age has ever vouchsafed him.
The real difference between the optimists and the pessimists is that the former use a quantitative, the latter a qualitative, appraisal. It is our task to synthetize these, if possible; both have a good case, for truth is divided between them. It may be, however, that they ' are inclined to emphasize the wrong things, though it is an undoubtedly good sign when we find in any age a group of thinkers, whatever their conclusions may be, who make a deliberate attempt to evaluate the activi ties of their fellow men in terms of cultural direction or advance. It is good to ask ourselves why we do certain things, what we are doing them for, and where THE UNIVERSITY OF TORON~OQUARTER, LY they are taking us to. I t reveals a consciousness of ourselves and of our aims that is altogether salutary.
It was the fate of nineteenth-century thinkers to ask, too few questions ' about industry and social organization. This does not mean that there were no rebels, no dissenters, no critics. We have only to think of Robert Owen, the father of the co-operative movement; Shaftesbury, reformer and philanthropist; Maurice and I(ingsley, Christian socialists; Karl Marx, that sinister figure whose sociological theories were to become more important than his economics; Ruskin, an idealist who rebelled chiefly against the ugliness of industry; later the Fabian group of intellectuals, the Webbs" Wells, and Shaw. These last are really of our own time and overlap· the periods. On the whole, and in spite of these thinkers, the nineteenth -century was one of complacency, an almost indecent and inhuman complacency. This was due very. largely to the following factors: (I) the economic conc, eptions and the psychological and ethical ideas that were carried over from the eighteenth century and persisted as the broad basis of nineteenth-century social theory; (2) the rapid' expansion of machine industry and the rapid urbanisation and unsettlemen t of labour; (3) the lack eff general education and political democracy: this meant that the' general expression of opinion 'was one-' sided, and representative, for the most part, of employer or landlord interests. These three factors require further explanation if we are to understand the body of ideas that we have carried over from that period.
The eighteenth cen tury was a cen rury of tremendous change. Industry which had broken the old local bonds of the crafts and had grown in to a national domestic system had been hampered for a century and more by irksome restrictions. Trade was under the handicap of mercantilism, an issue that was to help greatly in the severance of the American colonies. Internal industry in its reaction to the needs of a growing foreign trade was seeking new m" eans to improve and" increase production~ As early as 1710 we have Newcomen's steam engine, a cumbersome glutton for coal that was to be a portent for a new age-the Power Age.
In "1776, when Adam Smith published his Wealth of Nations, his fellow countryman, James Watt," had improved and applied his rotary steam engine. These two events together mark the age that was to follow. Smith, in refuting the theories of mercantilism, preached the economics of t"aissez-faire, the conception that freedom of enterprise coupled with the natural beneficence " of competition would lead to the optimum bonum of social efficiency and social harmony. Bentham's philosophy of the greatest good of the greatest number was the counterpart of Smith's economic theories, and both owed a great deal to Locke's earlier theory of natural rights. In short, the basis for economic action was absolute freedom. The best government was the government that interfered least, and since the forces of competi'tion ' would ensure all-round economic justice, the greatest good of the greatest number would automatically ensue. Smith himself made some very important qualifications to the simple outline of this theory, but the qualifications were forgotten in the general acceptance of the thesis. And it fitted well with the times~ What could be simpler, what could be better than to leave to each the unrestricted right to do with his own what to him seemed n10st advantageous, the worker to sell his labour to the highest bidder, the "owner to make such arrangements in the employment of land, labour, or capital, as would bring him the greatest return? In both cases the free working oCthe laws of supply and demand would correct any tendency on the part of the free bargaine-rs to get more than their individual deserts. Nothing could surely improve on this excellent natural arrangement.
This was the body of thought that was ushered in -wi th machine industry. Let us see what the immediate social effects of it were. Briefly the social effects were as follows: up to and after the turn of the nineteenth century the condition · of the working class was in almost every respect deplorable. The new cities were slums; the working day for children, women, and men' , was ten, twelve, and fourteen hours: labour was brutalized physically, mentally, and -morally. The chronicles of the ear1y nineteenth century in Great Britain are heartrending reading. And all this happened when the power· to produce wealth was increasing 'at an accelerating speed. There grew up a new and · powerful middle class, dominant politically and industrially, and backed by the economic theorizing of Adam Smith's disciples. The theory of free bargaining, a bargaining that was to produce the greatest happiness -of the greatest number, interdicted, if it did not actually prevent, the interference of the state. Darwin's contribution to biology did not mitigate the theory of laissez-faire.
Indeed, it was taken as a further proof and justification of it, since the survival of the fittest could readily be interpreted as a result of econolnic competition. But implicit in the theory of evolution is biological adaptation. Let us see briefly what forms that adaptation took.
If the classical economists were right in emphasizing competi tion as the biologic· al struggle for existence, they were wrong in ignoring almost completely its biological complement, namely, mutual aid .or association. They not only overstated their case; they failed to envIsage its implications. I ts social implications in the machine age, an age that by virtue of its intense division of labour and specialization involved a social solidari ty unprecedented in its reach, were an increasing degree of social antagonism, maladjustment, inequality, and group lnJustice. The shift from hand tools to power tools, from individual handicraft to mass formations of labour and capital, made the depende~ce of those who were henceforth divorced from -the control or ownership of the tools they used, the concomitant of grave social disorders. The obvious fallacy of laissez-faire, apart frotTI its nalve belief in natural adjustments, was that, so far from there being even the possibility of free and equal bargaining, the very non-interference of the state gave a virtual protection to the property or owner groups and no protection whatever to " the dependent groups. As long as governments did nothing the scales were really ~eighted against the latter. If the supreme test of equality or justice is the degree ~r success with which different social conditions may be equalized, then the social outcome of the industrial revolution was an immediate disharmony, an increasingly lop-sided social utility, an unhappiness of the greatest numqer.
The social reaction to this dysfunctioning was association. As a biological counterpoise" to the malaise of competition it took two forms: first, social protection; second, self-protection. Social protection is the" aid which society as a whole through the exercis~ of its legislative and executive authority may extend to its individual melnbers or to specified functional groups. Self-protection is truly mutual aid, the help that members of any functional group, in the absence of any restraining power, may give to themselves. I t implies the surrender of some part of individual freedom or "natural right" in exchange for the greater security or benefits to be derived from group action and group solidarity. Trade unionism. is a good example, though this form of functional asso-, ciationism is not confined to working or trade groups but is found among producers and distributors. From ' the economic . point of view, and without considering for the moment its social or biological importance, selfprotection of functional groups is primarily an attempt_ on the part of individuals with a like economic interest to obtain in exchange for their services, as large a share of the national income as possible. These two forms, therefore, of social adaptation to an economic organization which has grown up under a doctrinaire the~ry of the beneficence of free competition coupled with an astonishing advance in engineering technology, are ' of tremendous importance in any evaluation of the social implications of luodern industry. _ The early nineteenth century in Great Britain, the home of the new technique, savv (I) the absence and the denial of social protection) (2) restrain t on attempts at span taneous self-protection. The social history of the period is one long travail in social adjustment. The' correctives to theory and to practice, slow in tneir inauguration and only approached with empirical scepticism, have gradually reversed the one-sidedness of noninterference, have given us 'a new and possibly a better · social philosophy, but in their turn present problems of a social, poE tical, and economic · character, that call for a more searching analysis of social trends than appears to be given to it by statesmen and other leaders of .. ,'" , op1nion.
I t is not enough simply to ask whether we are culturally decadent or progreSSIve, to point to writings on the wall or to give statistical returns of production. It is the process of economic adjustment that is importan t, ' the underlying tensions, the social by-products of our economic organization as a whole. What is the parten t of these? What do they signify for man, not as . ,quantitative achievements 'nor yet as qualitative com-. pari'sons with some a priori standard of good or with some age that revealed special qualities of its own? What are the special qualities that our own age is rev~aling? Wha t 'are we making of our new science, or rather what is our new science making of us? What we are eventually going to become is less important than the pres en t process of becoming~ And the process of becoming is the outcome of a living tissue of social relations, the most important of which for a machine age such as ours is the broad life-stream of ideas and activities in our economic structure.
I have said something of competition and co-operation as biological manifestations of the economic process. I have shown that an undue insistence on the one to the exclusion of the other was bound to lead to social injustice, social disharmony, and a realignment of economic forces. The nineteenth century, out of which our present' balance of forces has grown, was , a time of social searching for 'Such correctives as I have mentioned. Follow the history of labour self-protection in Great Britain during that period and no 'better example can be found. Shut out from self-help by the Conspiracy Acts of 1799, the workers' organizations. were driven underground. Not until 1825, after Place, with a curious reliance on the pure doctrine of laissez-faire, ~ad shown (to the satisfaction of the pure theorists) that labour's right to organize could not and would not raise wages beyond the competitive level, did the partial right to form trade 453 ) unions usher in the period of long apprenticeship in self-help.
, . ' We see throughou t the century a search on the part of labour to find the best means of self-help. The workers turn from politics to indus'try, and when that fails, they turn (i.gain from industry to politics. They supported the Reform Bill of 1832 in the hope that the extension of the' franchise would help them, only to :find they had changed political masters, that they had ' substituted factory owners for landowners at St. Stephen's. Chag-' rined they turn to industry ' and organize the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union, the .first attempt at a general strike. That failed . ignominiously, and immediately they furnish a political programme and we have the Chartist Movement, 1837-I848. That too failed and they turn back to industry. Giving up all 'ldeas of a national labour organlzation, they began patiently to 'organize self-help trade by trade; the strikes of 1844 were unorganized protests against reduced wages; this had shown the necessity for closer trade organization. From 1867 to 1884'we find them back in . politics again; the labour legislation of the period and the hopes held out by the Liberals, especially by Gladstone, induced them to revive their faith in the state as the best vehicle for protection. The partial democracy "that was achieved did not, however, give' that' reward for which they ~ad hoped) and up to the outbreak of the Great \tVar we find the workers assaulting both the industrial and the political ' fronts. The rise in prices from the middle of the nineties was accompanied by a series of strikes in Inining, engineering, the docks, the railroads. Meanwhile a process of trade union consoli-' dation proceeded, emerging in the Trade Union Co'ngress, a return to the ideals of 1834. The fornlation of ,the La, bour 'Party, supported financially by the trade union movement, and by the intellectuals, the Fabian Society, which gave it the ammunition it required for its political guns, led to an increasing political influence in and , out' of Parliamen t. The granting of full manhoQd, and later full 'womanhood; suffrage after the War placed in the hands of the workers the political power they had been striving to gain since 183'2. ' Political democracy is, however, not industrial democracy and the more urgent of the workers, those desirous of full emancipation, made a trial of strength in the industrial arena once more 'when the General Strike in 1926 collapsed just as the first general strike, almost a hundred years earlier, had done. This) very briefly, is the developmen t of self-help in the worker groups. That it has improved the bargaining power of a class which, at the beginning of last century, , was almost a Class of industrial serfs, cannot be gainsaid; tha_ t , it has used that bargaining power som' etimes' unwisely, is no condemnation of the biological reaction involved. This self-help, however, did not cover the whole , :field of working class groups, and it is an interesting commen tary on the thesis that the government should not 'interfere in bargaining arrangements that the British government, besides on occasion arbitrating between , warring economic interests, has itself introduced legislation, as early as 1909, to create trade unions where these did not or could not readily exist, for such has been the precise ' effect of the Trades Board Acts which now apply to over a hundred industries. So much for selfhelp of one economic class. What about consumers?
The first attempt at co-operation alnong consumers took place when twenty-eight flannel-weavers, "the Rochdale Pioneers", opened their co-operative store in a back lane of Rochdale, England, in 1844. At the present time the -co-operative movement in Great Britain has nearly six million enrolled share-holding members repre.., senting approximately one-thirc~_ of all the families in Great Britain. "Its working capital," according to the Webbs, "entirely accumulated from its own member-, ship in the course of its operations exceeds one hundred million pounds sterling. I ts annual turnover of commodities and services supplied to its members reaches 'two hundred million pounds sterling." Wholesale arid retail, the co-operative movement is no longer a purely distributive function. I t owns tea plantations in India and Ceylon, wheat farms in Manitoba, the largest flour mills and boot factories in Europe, soap works, cotton and woollen facto, ri,es, plants for the manufacture of a vast variety of food products ,and home utensils; besides ' its own ships, its printing works, and'its furniture plants, it possesses its own banking and.insurance services. The movement has extended from Great Britain to some thirty different countries, and it is estimated that for Europe alone consumers' co-operatiqn comprises, in the aggregate, twenty million families. I-Iere is self-help' with a vengeance! , Producers, both in production and distribution, have been very successful in the application of the co-operative principle, but as that takes many forms, some of which in their present structure are just as anti-social as free competition, I propose to deal with it 'later. Meanwhile let us see what has happened to government pi-otection of individuals and groups. This is an immense and growing field. ' For the sake of clarity it will suit our purpose best if we analyze its categories briefly.
The state has interfered to protect (a) the consumer, (b) the worker, (t) the producer or employer. The con-\ sumer has been protected against _ adulteration and shoddy. goods; a code of standards to prevent cheating in a variety of forms has been evolved. The state had to protect the consumer against not only dishonest competitive practices but also against his own ignorance. But above all the state in many countries has been obliged, reluctantly at first, to develop a code of protection for the worker. This code covers: (a) protection against the incidents of employmen t, viz.-,' insanitary arrangemen ts, long hours, low wages, dangerous industrial environment both as to limb and health, etc.; (b) protection agairy,st the concomi tant effects of industrial occupation-impecunious old age, widowhood, disabilities, unemploymen t, etc.; (c) protection against unequal bargaining by instituting regulations as to the manner and means of wage payment, by providing for industrial councils ·and trade boards, by arbitration, etc. 'This list could be extended, but if we get the broad principle behind this social protection and social control, we shall have correlated this function of growth with that of group self-help. ' The essential feature of social protection is that it amplifies and tends to supersede span taneous self-protection. Originally intended only to correct the working of free competition as it-affected children and women, who obviously had no equality in bargaining power, it has come to extend protection beyond the limits possible to mere self-protection. ,However helpfiIl self-protection may be, there is much that it cannot do; this the state in most' highly industrialized countries .has. been obliged 'to do. The one supplements the other. Together they have restored not only a manner of equivalence in bargaining power but a social milieu in which the worst effects of one-sided power have been curtailed if n' ot -entirely negatived. That a greater measure of social justice has resulted, that the fruits of power production have been more diffusely enjoyed, that standards of living and standards of culture ha:ve been raised, cannot be seriously questioned. The important thing, however, is not the mere attainment of physical betterment for the mass of the people and the 'removal of a large part of the psychic and physical costs of social production and distribution; it is the gradual emergence of a social consciousness, a consciousness that ' comes .
not. from the objective survey of social conditions alone bu t from a sincere . appraisal of the ends of economic organization as a social tool. When we are pessimistic about "what mankind is heading for, when we see nothing but the abyss, we are reckoning the debit side of our social balance sheet and we can make the debit appear incredibly large and formidable; when we are unduly optimistic, we are looking only at the credit , side and counting our sometimes dubious blessings.
Before coming to that I would say a few words about self-help in another direction. Employers have complained of the bitter mercilessness of economic warfare as vehemen tly as any other economic group. They speak of cut-throat competition, of the wastes of the whole process, of the' tragedy of .overproduction and consequent bankruptcies, of risks, uncertain ties, losses, depressions. All this is true. The momentum that free individualism obtained on the spring-board of machine production hld for a time the wastes, the losses, the risks. The growth of the corpora..:: tion and the legal fictions by which it obtained a pers.onality gave it, in some countries, the right to enter into its own protective arrangements just -as consumers and workers were forced to do. There has grown up in consequence a consolidation of capital in a variety of I forms. We are face'd to-day with tremendously powerful combinations, vertical and horizontal, aggregations' of c~pital units that embrace whole industries and are ofte'n international in their scope. There are cartels, , associations, pools, mergers, trusts, combinations, and ,cross varieties of all of these. Their object is the same as that which necessitated group protection on the part of other functional groups-self-protection. The aim too is, of course, the same, namely to obtain for their ,services as large a ·proportion of the national income ' as they can get. I t is to this that the process of biological adaptatio'n has led us-the substitution in 'each group of co-operation for compe' ti tio~ while retaining competition among the groups themselves. From laissezfaire to' functional groul) protection, that is to date the social by~product of the advent of machine production. Some countries are actually promoting this general cctrustification" of industry. They see in this integration' of competitive units a great reduction in the costs of production, a reduction also in the , costs of distribution.
They hope to be able to direct thes~ economies to the pockets of the consumer in lower commodi ty prices while ensuring to, the producer al! adequate return for his services without the onus of ~astes that arise from unco-ordinated production. Germany has probably led in this field, and Great Britain is attempting by government guidance and ,financial help to accelerate the movement towards rationalization in her coal and textile industries. The United States from 1890 has, with the object of removing so-called restraints of trade, attempted to hold up, this development, though, by legal fictions and other convenient devices, the movement in the . United States has progressed probably further than, elsewhere. At present some two hundred American corporations own forty per cent. of the corporate-wealth of the country. The holding company has achieved what the consolidated amalgamation of units could not, under legal restr\ctions, bring about without costly and tedious lawsui(s. ' But even the United States is now more conciliatory towards consolidation than formerly. Court decisions are allowing mergers of one kind and another j while the Transportation Act of I9'20 and / subsequen t enactments actually make provision for the regional grouping of railroad systems. Even in banking, where the American tradition was in favour of the local unit as against branch banking, the tendency is in the direction of larger aggregates.
The consolidation of capital units, a movement characteristic of all highly industrialized countries, presents many problems. The chief problem is one of social con trol. Government will be forced to con trol these "states within the st~te" so that general justice may be done. The consumer lnust be protected. The worker must be protected. The bargaining power that the latter has painfully built up through five or six generations of travail may be rendered nugatory in £a, ce of such powerful financial resources as are possessed by these nation-wide trusts. If the' worker, acting in concert with his fellow craftsmen j has been able to pit the low-cost producer against the high-cost) producer and to gain a greater degree of bargaining force in consequence, he may be worse off now than before when he is faced not with individual producers, no matter how organized to meet labour disputes, but with one gigantic organization that lives, moves, and has its being as one unit. In the struggle for shares of the national income, it may well happen that the shares will be more disproportionately divided than heretofore.
The suhversionof free cOI!1petition between units, whether of workmen or of employers, has led, -therefore, to a growth of co-operation on an unprecedented scale. A new kind of competition has eventuated, a competition between great self-help aggregations of producers, of workers, and to some extent, especially in Europe, of consumers., Underlying the whole social organism there -is tension and strain of its functional parts. The biological adaptation to free competition under machine production and distribution, an adaptation in which co-operation has attemp'ted to correct the worst incidents of co'mpetition, has brought about a new social alignment, a new type of competitive opposition, and the need for a greater consciousness on the part of the community of its implications. This is far more important than the dissensions about human beings becoming robots or not. The mechanization of humanity is not the biological 'form -of adaptation that is n10st important.
Indeed, too great stress is placed on this aspect of the machine age; it is true that probably five per cen t. of the working population is Inachine-tied, that we are all more or less machine-minded, and that this is bound to have psychological and social by-products. It may he true that the emancipation of women from domesticity has led to greater moral mobility; that many people have not yet learned how to use greater leisure for their ~wn n1ental or cultural satisfaction; that our insistence on materialistic standards, with their divorcement of the mind from naturalistic fears, may b~ reflected in a -lower coriception of worth, of human ends, of ultimate values; and that crime, crimes of violence and political graft, may be largely a by-product of these materialistic standards.
.. ·These, however, taken in the large, are but excres-cences, superficial manifestations of the deeper sociological tensions inherent in our whole economic organization.· Basically the struggle for income, fot claims to future income; for control of the means to income, is the main factor. I have shown how this has led and is leading to a new alignmen t of social forces, to a new conception of social ends ·as a whole and to a greater consciousness of purpose. The process is further advanced in Europe than it is on the North American continent, where greater opportunity,greater persorial mobility, and less staticism, combined with a later exploitation of natural resources, . have made possible the postponement or at least th~ obfuscation of the underlying trend. But it is there nevertheless. . . Sqciety will have to .face it and determine , what new manner of controls it will have to fashion for our economic machine. It is no longer a matter of whether governmen t should or should not interfere wi th business·-though business. has always interfered with gov~rnment-but what forms this interference should take as a conscious policy of economic direction. Behind the degree and manner of in terference lies the broad ethical concept of social good. We have to determine what is good for man not in any hypothetical age but in our age. In other words, we must make a . factual appraisal of what is possible to us in the amelioration of economic conditions. If we still continue to think that the underlying tensions are good for us, that the balance of economic forces gives a rough measure of social justice, we must utilize the forces of' society to prevent the maladjustments under the new alignment that took place under the old. We must see that the economies of unification do not disappear in economic rent, in capitalizations of earning power at the, expense of the community, that the consolidations of industry are not used against the consumer or against the worker) and, that, they do not entrench themselves as social parasites demanding and getting more for their social service than it merits. , All this involves the extension rather than the diminu-,tion of social control. Society through its institutions 'must stand as the guardian of economic justice. Above all, this imp)ies a consciousness of the good and the bad that are in oUf social organization, and the will, no matter what group interests are involved, to direct modern industry to the end that the good in it be not lost but in, every way promoted. ' Though the machine was made for man and not man , for the machine, we must keep in mind that the way we use i't and the means we employ to control and direct it are thems'dves deep causes of social tensions and finally of sociological adaptations that predicate our cultural trend. Economic values must in the long run be subservient to human values. The 'supreme problem of our age, therefore, is how to control our machine organization in such a way as to make it a real tool for man's welfare.
Cyclical fluctuations, symptomatic as they are of our inability to direct our economic functioning conscious1y and purposively, ought to remind us that for a large mass of people there is not simply an , occasional depression ~ut a chronic d~pression, a depression which includes not only under-employment with all its attendant socia1 and moral repercussions but the psychic costs of labourthe fears of insecurity', of unemployment, of impecunious old age, of sickness, of pauperism. It is in these terms that we must 'evaluate our machine age and'the culture it has brought us. Self-help and social help will ' still go on; biological adaptations must necessarily ensue; the struggle of economic groups for income will change social stresses to new social alignments~ and a new sociological pattern will always be in process of evolving. But it is dOli btful if we can place reliance on such blind forces alone; they are responses to irritation stimuli and are capable of misdirect~on and unnecessary waste of energy and! purpose. I t is doubtful if in an age of science, an age of engineering technique, we can safely leave these forces to find their balance on their own account. That kind of laissez-faire or irrational naturalism is a -thing of the past. Science in industry predicates science in its con trol also. This implies a greater consciousness of ec.onomic means to social ends than we are capable of at present. Itis not simply a matter of going somewhere somehow; we n1.ust be aware of where we .are going and the best way of getting there. In such an even t the forebodings of the gloomy philosophers that the decline of our civilization is imminent would not discourage us. Our culture would not depend on, or be a by-product of, the machine and the vagaries of its (unctioning: it would be free to use the machine and the science it implies as a means towards its own promotion and fulfilment. .But perhaps that is too great a concession to the optimists.
